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THE REACH TOWARD ENGLAND-HAWAII'S
LONG-ARM JURISDICTION
In Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth,' the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was called upon to interpret and apply
the 1965 Hawaii long-arm statute;2 the decision does not represent
any dramatic new development in the ever-expanding field of long-arm
jurisdiction. It does, however, illustrate the undesirable results that
sometimes flow from the currently widespread judicial misconception
of the criteria for determining when a state court may obtain personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.
Ever since the Supreme Court's celebrated decision in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington,' the lower courts have tended to abandon
the traditional guidelines for ascertaining the constitutional limits on
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants4 and have entered that ab-
stract and indistinct realm where jurisdiction is based on the existence
of certain "minimum contacts" between the defendant and the forum
state.5 In recent years, a misconception of the criteria for determin-
ing the existence of the requisite minimum contacts has resulted in a
virtual breakdown of all restrictions on state long-arm jurisdiction.
The necessary degree of association between the defendant and the
forum has become "minimum" to the point of absurdity.
It is the purpose of this Note to analyze the ostensible demise of
1. 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969).
2. HAWAII REv. LAws § 634-71 (1968) provides: (a) Any person, whether or
not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of
the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits his person, and, if an individual, his
personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of
action arising from the doing of any of the acts:
(1) The transaction of any business within this State;
(2) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
(3) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this State;
(4) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this State
at the time of contracting.
(b) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this State, as provided in this section, may be made by serving the summons
upon the defendant outside this State, as provided in section 634-39, with the same
force and effect as though summons had been personally served with this State ...
3. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4. The traditional bases of jurisdiction over foreign corporations were the fic-
tions of presence, consent and doing business. Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due
Process Clause and The In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CrI. L. Rv.
569, 577-86 (1958).
5. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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the "minimum contacts" concept as a workable criterion for fixing the
constitutional bounds of long-arm jurisdiction and to emphasize the
need-and precedential support-for a heightened judicial attentiveness
to convenience as the crucial term in the jurisdictional equation. The
result reached by the Ninth Circuit in Duple strongly accentuates the
need for acknowledging the primacy of this convenience factor.
The Factual Setting
Plaintiff Hollingsworth was injured while riding as a passenger in
a bus operated by Maui Island Tours in Hawaii. The bus involved in
the accident had been ordered originally by Maui Island Tours from
Haleakala Motors, a Hawaii dealer. Haleakala Motors had conveyed
the order to Vauxhall, an English corporation, which had in turn sub-
contracted the manufacture of the vehicle bodies to Duple, another
English corporation. The evidence showed that all parties involved in
the manufacture and sale of the bus were at all pertinent times aware
that it would eventually be sold and operated in Hawaii.
After the injury, Hollingsworth brought a strict-liability action
against Maui Island Tours, Haleakala Motors, Vauxhall, and Du-
ple in the Hawaii Federal District Court. Federal subject-matter ju-
risdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. Duple moved to dis-
miss the action and quash service of summons on the ground that the
Hawaii court could not constitutionally acquire in personam jurisdic-
tion. The motion was denied and Duple took an interlocutory ap-
peal.6
The Ninth Circuit's Decision
Hawaii's long-arm statute was copied verbatim from the first of
the comprehensive state long-arm statutes-the one enacted by Illinois
in 1959.1 The Illinois statute was construed by the Illinois Supreme
Court in the noted case of Gray v. American Radiator and Standard
Sanitary Corp.8 Under Hawaii law, when a statute is borrowed from
another state, the judicial construction of the statute by the courts of
that state is binding on the courts in Hawaii, unless the Hawaii legisla-
ture manifests a contrary intent.9
Duple had challenged the in personam jurisdiction of the district
court on three grounds. First, Duple contended that it had committed
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964) provides for a discretionary appeal where the
trial judge certifies that the point involves a "controlling question of law as to which
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal
from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation ....
7. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1959).
8. 22 Il. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
9. In re Sawyer, 41 Hawaii 270, 273-74 (1956).
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no "tortious act" in the State of Hawaii, and hence there was no basis
for jurisdiction under the Hawaii statute. 10 The court disposed of
this contention by citing the Gray decision," wherein the Illinois court
had rejected an identical claim. 2 Second, Duple maintained that the
alleged negligent manufacture of the coach body occurred prior to the
passage of the Hawaii statute, and that retroactive application of the
statute would work an injustice. The court rejected this contention
also, citing another Illinois decision where a similar argument had
failed. 3 Finally, Duple maintained that, under the unique circum-
stances of the case, the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice"'1 4 would preclude application of the Hawaii statute. The ma-
jority answered this contention as follows:
In our judgment, the presence of Duple's coach bodies in Hawaii,
brought about by Duple's sale to Vauxhall with knowledge that
the product was destined for Hawaii, was sufficient contact with
Hawaii to meet the requirements of due process. 15
In a strong dissent, Judge Ely raised three issues. First, he con-
sidered that the defendant had not purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities in Hawaii and thus had not invoked
the benefit and protection of Hawaii law.' 6 Secondly, he contended
the doctrine of "fair play and substantial justice" must be applied on a
case-by-case basis with an emphasis on fairness to all parties.'" And
finally, he concluded that the majority of the court had unwisely in-
truded into the realm of foreign relations by setting a precedent that
might have untoward international repercussions.' 8
10. Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231, 233-34 (9th Cir.
1969).
11. Id.
12. In Gray, the Ohio defendant manufactured valves which it sold to a Penn-
sylvania corporation which in turn incorporated them into furnaces it manufactured.
One of the furnaces was sold to an Illinois resident who was injured when it exploded.
In the subsequent action, the manufacturer of the valve (Titan) argued that even if
the valve had been negligently manufactured the "tortious act" would have occurred
where the valve was made and not where the injury was sustained. The court flatly
rejected this contention, saying that the alleged negligent manufacture of the product
cannot be separated from the resulting injury, and the "tort" was committed in Illi-
nois. In a case involving substantially similar facts, the supreme court of New York
expressly rejected the reasoning in Gray. Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209
N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
13. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
14. In International Shoe, the Court said that if the nonresident defendant had
certain "minimum contacts" with the forum, the maintenance of the suit against him
would not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice". Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316.
15. 417 F.2d at 235.
16. Id. at 237.
17. Id. at 238-39.
18. Id. at 239.
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The Minimum Contacts Doctrine-Lower Court
Disregard for Supreme Court Precepts
The long-arm jurisdiction exercised by the federal court in Duple
was purportedly authorized by a state statute framed in the light of-
and necessarily limited by-the Supreme Court's "minimum contacts"
doctrine enunciated in International Shoe.19 In that decision the
Court asserted that if a nonresident defendant has some minimum de-
gree of association with the forum state, the assumption of jurisdiction
over him will not offend the "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice'. 20 Several years later, the Supreme Court in Hanson
v. Denckla2' attempted to formulate a more definite test for determin-
ing exactly what conduct constitutes "minimum contacts":
...The application of that rule [minimum contacts] will vary
with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but it is
essential in each case that there be some act by which the de-
fendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.
22
The trend of lower-court decisions since Hanson has expanded
the "minimum contacts" concept to a point where it no longer seems
effective as a standard for determining jurisdiction. The lower courts,
seizing upon the word "purposefully" in the Hanson opinion, have set
up what is essentially a "foreseeability test" for determining whether
or not jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is constitutionally per-
missible.28 In a products liability case, this test dictates that the de-
fendant's amenability to suit in a particular forum is conditioned solely
on whether his product is placed intentionally in the stream of com-
merce and whether its resulting entry into the forum state is reasonably
to be expected.24  In Duple, reliance on this "foreseeability test" was
unnecessary because the court found that defendant Duple had actual
knowledge of its product's eventual use in Hawaii.25
19. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
20. Id. at 316.
21. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
22. Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
23. See Gorfinkel & Lavine, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in California Under New
Section 410.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 21 HASTNGS L.J. 1163, 1196 (1970).
In Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr.
113 (1969), the California court placed the burden on the defendant to show that it
was unforeseeable that his product would enter the state.
24. See Gorfinkel & Lavine, supra note 23, at 1196.
25. The court in Duple concluded that jurisdiction was proper because the de-
fendant's product was actually present in the forum, and because the defendant had
actual knowledge of its intended use in Hawaii. 417 F.2d at 235. The court
did not consider the question whether jurisdiction would still have been proper had the
defendant simply sold the motor bodies to Vauxhall with no knowledge of their ulti-
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Another limitation laid down in Hanson is the proposition that
due process will not be violated if the defendant, by conducting activi-
ties in the forum, has enjoyed the benefits and protections of the laws
of the forum. In such a case, it is pointed out, the defendant is justi-
fiably burdened with obligations imposed by the forum, one of which
is the duty to defend locally' 6 Duple presents the perfect example of
a situation where, even though the "purposeful availment" require-
ment of Hanson is apparently satisfied, it can hardly be said that the
laws of Hawaii afforded Duple any benefit or privilege sufficiently sub-
stantial to justify a correlative obligation to defend locally. It is doubt-
ful whether the rather remote benefit Duple derived from the undis-
turbed use of the Hawaii market is the sort of "activity" envisioned by
the Court in Hanson.1
7
Thus the Ninth Circuit majority in Duple did what other courts
have tended to do in recent years. They concentrated almost exclu-
sively on the first of the two Hanson requirements-the purposefulness
of the defendant's conduct 2"-and disregarded the second-that the de-
fendant must have invoked the benefits and protections of the laws of
the forum state.
29
mate destination. Presumably, this act of intentionally placing the bodies in the com-
mercial stream, even without actual knowledge of their eventual use in Hawaii, would
have sufficed under the criteria the court was using. See Gray v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 442, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961).
But see Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
26. In Hanson, the court stated that the trust instrument in question was exe-
cuted by a defendant trust company having no connection with the forum state, and
that therefore the suit could not be said "to be one to enforce an obligation that arose
from a privilege the defendant exercised in Florida." 357 U.S. at 252. Because the
defendant exercised no real privilege in the state, there was no corresponding duty to
defend locally. In the Hanson opinion, the court compared McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), and concluded that if a defendant had "substantial
contact" with the forum state, this would be a sufficient invocation of the benefits
and protections of the state to give rise to an obligation to defend locally.
27. The activity of Duple in Hawaii which creates an obligation to defend
there can certainly not be based on the contract between Duple and Vauxhall in
England. This contract clearly has no "substantial contact" with Hawaii and thus would
fail under the McGee reasoning. The only other "activity" that the court could pos-
sibly be using to satisfy the Hanson test would seem to be the mere "presence" of the
defendant's product in Hawaii. This contention that "presence" automatically equals
"activity" under the Hanson test has often been expressly rejected as being contrary
to the doctrine of Hanson and International Shoe. See, e.g., da Silveria v. Westphalia
Separator Co., 248 Cal. App. 2d 789, 57 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1967); O'Brien v. Corn-
stock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963). But see Buckeye Boiler Co.
v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
28. See text accompanying notes 23 & 24 supra.
29. See Phillips v. Anchor Hockins Claims Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d
732 (1966).
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Minimum Contacts Doctrine as Applied in Duple-
Convenience Factor Left Out of Account
The factual situation in Duple, so the majority reasoned, fit read-
ily within the Hanson interpretation of the "minimum contacts" doc-
trine. The mechanical test applied to determine jurisdiction ° was ap-
parently suggested by the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in
Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.31 and by
the trend of lower court decisions following International Shoe and
Hanson.32 The majority paid heed only to such facts as were neces-
" 33sary to establish the elements of "actual knowledge" and "presence'.
They disregarded many additional facts which should have been taken
into account.3 4  No importance was attached, for example, to the fact
that Duple's connection with the forum was extremely remote, and
that Duple was an alien corporation located almost halfway around the
world.3 5
30. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
31. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
32. E.g., Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co., 53 Cal. 2d 77, 346 P.2d 409
(1959); Singer v. Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
Since International Shoe and Hanson, the lower courts have generally held that juris-
diction is proper where the defendant's product causes damage in the forum state and
where the defendant, by some affirmative act, has made it possible, if not probable,
that the product will enter the forum.
33. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
34. It is important that all facts of the case be considered when determining
whether jurisdiction is proper over a defendant. See Aftanase v. Economy Baler
Co., 343 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1965).
35. A recent California case was factually similar to the situation in Duple.
In da Silveria v. Westphalia Separator Co., 248 Cal. App. 2d 789, 57 Cal. Rptr. 62
(1967), the California court found that a German manufacturer of a cream valve did
not have sufficient contact with California to allow a local court to assert jurisdiction
under the long-arm statute. The facts indicated that the defendant sold the product to
an east coast corporation which in turn introduced it into California. The court made
it clear that the defendant had done no "act" which purposely availed itself of the privi-
lege of conducting business in California because there was simply no contact with the
forum at all with the exception of the one defective product. Furthermore, the court
stated: "We recognize the interest of this state in the regulation of businesses and
providing a convenient forum for the trial of cases by its own residents. [Citations
omitted]. But this cannot legally justify its assumption of jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation which has made an outright sale of goods in another state to a totally inde-
pendent non-exclusive distributor without title limitation for resale to the purchaser in
California. Traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' would clearly be
offended by forcing Westphalia into a California action under the circumstances indi-
cated by the record." Id. at 793-94, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 65-66. The test of Westphalia
was basically that the defendant must do some act in the state to be subject to its
jurisdiction. Mere presence of a product will not suffice. In Buckeye Boiler Co. v.
Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969), the California
court disapproved the Westphalia test on the grounds that it disregarded commercial
March 1971] CIVIEL PROCEDUR.E
Had the court, when deciding Duple, closely analyzed the Su-
preme Court's opinion in International Shoe, it would have discovered
that the entire doctrine of "minimum contacts", as a method for deter-
mining jurisdiction, is rooted in the underlying considerations of fair-
ness and convenience to the parties involved." This convenience fac-
tor is clearly intended to assume paramount importance in all determi-
nations of whether the exercise of jurisdiction results in "fair play and
substantial justice" to the parties.3 7  The Duple decision exemplifies
an unfortunate judicial tendency to determine the existence of mini-
mum contacts by applying an increasingly meaningless and mechanical
"foreseeability test" rather than by balancing conveniences. This ten-
dency, it would seem, runs contrary to principles set forth by the Su-
preme Court in International Shoe.
Importance of the Convenience Factor in
Determining Jurisdiction
In International Shoe, the Supreme Court addressed itself to the
twofold task of discarding various fictions theretofore used in order to
justify the exercise of judicial jurisdiction over foreign corporations38
and formulating new and more flexible criteria for determining
whether or not such exercises of jurisdiction comport with due process
practice. The court said that if the defendant receives "substantial economic benefit"
from the sale of his product in California, then jurisdiction is proper even though the
sale takes place outside of the state. The court, however, added that if the entry into
the state was unforeseeable, the "purposefully avails" test of Hanson would not be satis-
fied, and hence jurisdiction would be improper. Id. at 904, 458 P.2d at 65, 80 Cal.
Rptr. at 121.
In Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co., 53 Cal. 2d 77, 346 P.2d 409 (1959),
the California court held that jurisdiction was proper in substantially the same situa-
tion as Westphalia and Duple. In Cosper the defendant manufactured a gun in Massa-
chusetts that was sold to independent distributors and wholesalers at the Massachusetts
plant. The defendant did no business in California, with the exception of some ad-
vertising and the "servicing of dealer accounts," and yet jurisdiction was asserted. The
only apparent difference between Cosper and Westphalia appears to be the fact that
the defendant in Westphalia was an alien corporation. The difference in the degree of
contact seems negligible. Whether or not the court was influenced by this distinction
is not apparent from the opinion, but it appears to be the major distinguishing point in
the cases.
36. The court in International Shoe expressly adopted the language used by
Justice Learned Hand in Hutchinson v. Chace & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2d
Cir. 1930), as an important factor in "fair play and substantial justice." "This last
[continuous dealing in the state] appears to us to be really the controlling consid-
eration, expressed shortly by the word 'presence', but involving an estimate of the
inconveniences which would result from requiring it to defend, where it had been
sued." Id. at 141 (emphasis added).
37. Id.
38. 326 U.S. at 317-19.
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requirements. After exploring the essential meaning of the "due proc-
ess" clause, the Court determined that the concept was founded on the
principle of "fair play and substantial justice", s9 It requires a "fair
and orderly application of the law".40 From this premise, the Court
reasoned that the assumption of long-arm jurisdiction accords with
"due process" whenever there exist certain minimum contacts be-
tween the defendant foreign corporation and the forum state.
41 It
must be emphasized that the Court intended the basic test for the ex-
istence of minimum contacts to be qualitative in nature and based
mainly on an estimate of the inconveniences to the parties.4
In an attempt to devise a more workable formula for determining
exactly what a minimum contact is, the Supreme Court in Hanson v.
Denckla43 added the term "purposefully avails" to the language of In-
ternational Shoe.44 It must be kept in mind that this phrase was
merely intended to give the courts another tool to determine the re-
quirements of due process. It should not be interpreted as diminishing
the significance of the convenience factor, which the court in Interna-
tional Shoe had considered of prime importance in determining the
meaning of due process.
45
According to the clear mandate of the Supreme Court in Interna-
tional Shoe and Hanson, it is the duty of the court to balance the in-
conveniences to the parties, as well as the quality of the contact, in de-
termining jurisdiction. In view of the Court's express approval of
convenience as a factor to be considered, 46 and its patent distaste for
any mechanical formula to be applied in all fact situations,47 no other
conclusion can logically stand.
39. Id. at 316.
40. Id. at 319.
41. Id. at 316.
42. See note 36 supra.
43. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
44. In International Shoe, the court stated: "But to the extent that a corporation
exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and
protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to
obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the
activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a
suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue." 326
U.S. at 319. In Hanson, the court merely added the term "purposefully avails" as a
qualification to the International Shoe language: "[1It is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections
of its laws." 357 U.S. at 253 (emphasis added).
45. See text accompanying notes 36 & 37 supra.
46. See note 36 supra.
47. In International Shoe the court stated "It is evident that the criteria by
which we make the boundary line between those activities which justify the subjection
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It has often been suggested that the same criteria the courts use in
their discretionary application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens
be applied in determining jurisdiction. 48  Under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, a court must consider many convenience factors in de-
ciding whether or not to dismiss an action which it could otherwise
hear and determine. Two of the most important factors are the avail-
ability and cost of obtaining necessary witnesses and physical evi-
dence.49 These factors were never considered by the court in Duple.
Although a balance of these convenience factors in the factual setting
of Duple would not decisively favor either the English or the Hawaiian
forum, the fact remains that the court should have at least considered
these factors instead of relying exclusively upon a mechanical foresee-
ability test.
It is true that all the witnesses to the accident, and the wrecked
vehicle itself, are in Hawaii. In a normal negligence action, this alone
would probably make Hawaii the most convenient and practical forum.
In Duple, however, the action is not in negligence but rather in strict
liability. To prevail on the strict liability theory the plaintiff must
show that there was a defect in the manufacture or design of the motor
body, and that this defect existed when the motor body left the Duple
plant in England."0 Because the action is in strict liability, the plain-
tiff will not have the benefit of any presumptions based on the mere
of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot simply be mechanical or quan-
titative. . . . Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and
nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws
which was the purpose of the due process clause to insure." 326 U.S. at 319 (empha-
sis added).
48. See, e.g., Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the
In Personarn Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 657, 658 (1958); von
Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L.
REV. 1121, 1132 (1966). In Kilpatrick v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 166 F.2d 788 (2d Cir.
1948), Judge Hand, speaking of International Shoe, stated that "[I]t did give a new ex-
planation to corporate 'presence,' for it held that in order to determine that question the
court must balance the conflicting interests involved: i.e., whether the gain to the
plaintiff in retaining the action where it was, outweighed the burden imposed upon the
defendant; or vice versa. That question is certainly indistinguishable from the issue of
'forum non conveniens'." Id. at 790-91 (emphasis added). Judge Hand's statement
does not purport to indicate that the issues of forum non conveniens and jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants are one in the same; but rather that the concepts should
be based on the same considerations. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Juris-
diction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 312-14 (1956).
49. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); Koster v. Lum-
bermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 526 (1947).
50. See, e.g., W. PROSSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 684 (3d ed. 1964);
accord Williams v. Paducah Coca Cola Bottling Co., 343 Ill. App. 1, 98 N.E.2d 164
(1951).
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occurrence of the accident. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not
apply 5
1
With the burden on the plaintiff to affirmatively prove52 the
above-mentioned elements of the cause of action in strict liability, the
scale of conveniences is more evenly balanced and may move in favor
of England as the most convenient forum. The plaintiff must neces-
sarily produce physical evidence and witnesses from England to show
that there was in fact a defect in the design or manufacture of the bod-
ies, that this defect was inherent in the manufacture and that it existed
when the particular body left Duple's plant. Any procurable Hawaiian
evidence may have some evidentiary value in establishing a defect in
design, but it seems inconceivable that the plaintiff could avoid having
to produce certain evidence available only in England. By disregard-
ing any consideration of convenience as a factor in determining
whether the district court's jurisdiction over Duple is in keeping with
"fair play and substantial justice,"5 3 the Ninth Circuit appears to have
deviated from its previous position on the question of jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants.54 In a case prior to Duple, the Ninth Cir-
cuit placed heavy emphasis on a discretionary balancing of the incon-
veniences as a prerequisite to the assertion of jurisdiction. 5 In Du-
ple, the court merely conjured up guidelines previously used by other
courts under different factual situations and mechanically applied them
to the factual situation at hand.
If the court in Duple had examined closely the Supreme Court's
language in International Shoe and Hanson--or even the Illinois Su-
preme Court's language in Gray-it would have discovered that it was
not bound by any "rule" of Gray or by any mechanical rule of any
51. E.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 50, at 684.
52. See 4 ST. Louis L. Rv. 207 (1956).
53. See note 14 supra.
54. The Ninth Circuit in L.D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Industries, 265
F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959), followed a three-point test for determining jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants based on the Supreme Court decisions in International
Shoe, Hanson, and McGee: (1) the activity of the defendant in the forum; (2) the
cause of action arising from the defendant's activity; (3) the "substantial minimum
contact" between the defendant and the forum. Under this last criterion, the court
expressly adopted Judge Hand's "estimate of the inconveniences" test followed by the
Supreme Court in International Shoe. Speaking for the court in Reeder, Judge Barnes
stated: "We think a consideration of these factors (of forum non conveniens) leads us to
the inescapable conclusion that as to appellee Higgins the 'estimate of inconveniences'
weighs heavily in its favor. We need not point out again the slim thread of facts
which connects Higgins with the forum state which the appellant has chosen." Id. at
776 (emphasis added). This "estimate of the inconveniences test" was adopted by the
district court in Hawaii after the decision in Reeder. Hawaii Credit Card Corp. v.
Continental Credit Card Corp., 290 F. Supp. 848, 851 (D. Hawaii 1968).
55. L.D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Industries, 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959).
865March 1971]
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other case. Quite the contrary, the Supreme Court has expressly stated
that the courts should use discretion, on a case-by-case basis, in deter-
mining jurisdiction and should eschew mechanical formulas. 6  In
actuality, the Illinois court in Gray did not intend to supply a "rule"
for use by other courts in different factual situations. Gray simply in-
dicated that, under the circumstances of the case, the particular de-
fendant's activities were sufficient for the forum to assert jurisdiction
without violating due process.5 7  The facts of Duple clearly differ
from the facts of Gray-for one thing, the defendant in Duple, unlike
the defendant in Gray, was domiciled in a foreign country. Instead of
extracting a rule from Gray, the court in Duple should have exercised
its discretionary power and considered the concept of convenience in-
stead of mechanically asserting jurisdiction over the defendant.
International Implications
In his dissent, Judge Ely warned of possible international impli-
cations that could ensue when an American court asserts jurisdiction
over an alien corporation on the basis of an isolated transaction only
tenuously connected with the forum.5" Such an argument necessarily
presupposes, of course, that application of the state law (Hawaii's
long-arm statute) will adversely affect relations between the United
States and England and thereby violate the policy that members of the
international community are to be dealt with by the executive and leg-
islative branches of the Federal Government. Relations could con-
ceivably be adversely affected in a situation where an American court
insists on exercising power over an English subject, and English policy
dictates that no such power exists. Quite obviously, if England agrees
that jurisdiction of an American court is proper, no controversy will
arise.59
56. The Supreme Court in International Shoe clearly advocated that a "qualita-
tive" rather than a "quantative" test be used to determine whether the defendant's con-
tacts were sufficient to satisfy due process. See note 47 supra. This was also evident
in the language of Hanson. See text accompanying note 22 supra. See generally
Note, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Corporations Based on A Single Act: A New Sole
for International Shoe, 47 Gno. L.J. 342 (1958).
57. The Illinois court in Gray neither felt bound by a mechanical test for de-
termining jurisdiction, nor apparently intended to announce one: "Whether the type of
activity conducted within the State is adequate to satisfy the requirements [minimum
contacts] depends upon the facts of the particular case. . . . The question cannot
be answered by applying a mechanical formula or rule of thumb but by ascertaining
what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances," 22 Ill. 2d at 436, 176 N.E.2d at 765.
58. 417 F.2d at 239.
59. Jurisdiction over alien corporations is often asserted by United States courts
without leading to any international implications. See, e.g., Regis Nationale Des Usines
Renault Billancourt (Seine), France v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 2d 702, 25 Cal.
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Assuming arguendo that England would not recognize the Hawaii
federal court's jurisdiction over Duple, there is a possibility of result-
ing international repercussions when an English corporation is held to
answer in a forum almost halfway around the world based on an iso-
lated transaction with the forum. 60  The question that Judge Ely raises
is this: Can a federal court, recognizing possible adverse international
implications, refuse to apply a state jurisdictional statute and thereby
avoid usurping the executive and legislative function of formulating
foreign policy and regulating the relations between the United States
and other nations? The answer appears to be that it can.
Jurisdiction of a federal court is a procedural matter and is gov-
erned by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6 Under the federal
rules, a federal court is permitted to apply the jurisdictional statutes of
the state in which it is sitting.62 In most situations, a federal court is
mandatorily required to apply the substantive law of the state in which
it is sitting under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.63  The Erie
doctrine has apparently been extended to include state jurisdictional
laws.64 In most cases, therefore, a federal court has no choice but to
apply both the substantive law of the state and its long-arm statute.65
Rptr. 530 (1962). In Duple, jurisdiction over Vauxhall, a co-defendant, was never
questioned, and the possibility of any international problems never raised, even though
Vauxhall was an English corporation. The difference between the defendants in the
action was clearly that Vauxhall had sufficient contact with the United States gener-
ally to warrant jurisdiction even by English standards. See note 77 infra.
60. See text accompanying notes 72-74 infra.
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 4e, 4f.
62. "Whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder pro-
vides for the service of summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon
a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in which the district court is
held, service may be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the
statute or order, or if there is no provision therein prescribing the manner of serv-
ice, in a manner stated in this rule.... " FED. R. Crv. P. 4e.
63. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
64. After the Erie decision made the use of state substantive law mandatory on
the federal courts, the Supreme Court in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,-326 U.S. 99, 109
(1945), extended the Erie doctrine to include state procedural law that was "outcome
determinative:' Twenty years later, in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965),
the Supreme Court curtailed the Guaranty Trust test by making the use of federal
procedural rules mandatory on federal courts regardless of the outcome.
In Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963), the federal
court considered a state jurisdictional statute as being a choice of laws problem under
Erie. On the surface, this seems to be in conflict with the subsequent decision in
Hanna calling for the complete disregard of state procedural rules. In actuality, how-
ever, the decisions are not in conflict with each other. This is because Hanna, in
directing the use of the federal rules, is in effect directing the use of state jurisdictional
statutes under rule 4e, which is quoted in part at note 62 supra.
65. See note 64 supra.
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The Supreme Court held in Erie that the federal courts were
bound to apply state substantive law, and that there was no "federal
common law" that could be resorted to.66 The Court has made it
clear, however, that the Erie rule can be avoided in cases where a
strong countervailing public policy6 7 demands that state law be disre-
garded. Such is the situation where the pertinent state law would, if
applied, result in a judicial encroachment on the executive and legisla-
tive functions of making foreign policy and conducting foreign rela-
tions.6 The state law might be ignored on the ground that the inter-
national implications made the case a "federal question" case 9 or on
the ground that there is, in fact, some "federal common law" which can
be applied. 70  But whatever the rationale, the important point is that
the federal courts have traditionally refused to decide certain matters
more appropriately handled by the executive and legislative branches of
the Federal Government.
7'
66. 304 U.S. at 78.
67. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
68. The question of whether federal or state law should govern federal courts in
diversity of citizenship cases with possible international implications has been a subject
widely discussed by legal scholars. See, e.g., Edwards, The Erie Doctrine in For-
eign Affairs Cases, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 674 (1967); Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power
of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 805 (1964); Hill, The Law-Mak-
ing Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1024
(1967); More, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 DUKE LI. 248; Jessup, The
Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 A.J. INT'L
L. 740 (1939). The question appears to have been resolved in favor of federal law.
See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1967). In Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964), the Supreme Court, speaking specifically
of the act of state doctrine, indicated that where state law, if applied, would affect
the relation between the United States and other members of the international com-
munity, the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins would not apply, and federal law, gov-
erned by federal international policy, would control.
69. See Edwards, The Erie Doctrine in Foreign Affairs Cases, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV.
674, 690 (1967).
70. The concept of "federal common law" in the area of foreign relations is
constitutionally sound and strictly necessary to maintain a unified national policy.
Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 DUKE L.J. 248, 272-86. As brought
to light in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), the Erie
court did not really mean there was no such thing as "federal common law." This
was borne out in Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S.
92 (1938), decided the same day as Erie and written by the same author, which held
that apportionment of the water from an interstate stream was a question of "federal
common law." Id. at 110.
71. See, e.g., Zschering v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1957); Henkin, The Foreign
Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 805, 819-26
(1964). In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1917), the Supreme Court
stated: "[T]he conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed
by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative [departments]." Id. at 302.
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Assuming there is a conflict between American and English law
concerning the propriety of the district court's jurisdiction over the de-
fendant, the fact situation in Duple presents a possibility of interna-
tional repercussions resulting from the application of Hawaiian law.
In its furthermost implications, the decision may law a foundation for
the eventual requirement that alien corporations must defend a prod-
ucts liability suit anywhere in the fifty states an isolated product may
go. This requirement would become the "price" that would have to
be paid for the privilege of trading with the United States. It is certain
that in all but the most unusual cases, some remote connection could
be found between the alien corporation and the forum. As a last re-
sort, the courts could easily find that in placing the product in the
stream of American commerce72 it was "foreseeable" 73 that the prod-
uct would end up in the forum state. Once the long arms of the states
have reached to the four corners of the international community, it is
certain that the added burden thereby imposed on alien corporations
will in some way be passed back to the United States-either through
economic reprisals, or in the form of strained diplomatic relations. 4
As mentioned above, the possibility of international friction will
exist only if England refuses to recognize the jurisdiction asserted by
the American court. The English courts will recognize the jurisdic-
tion of foreign courts-and hence enforce foreign judgments-only if
jurisdiction is proper by English standards. 75 In an in personam ac-
tion, there are five situations where the English courts have tradition-
ally recognized the extraterritorial jurisdiction of foreign courts:
(1) Where deft. is a subject of the foreign country in which the
judgment has been obtained; (2) where he was resident in the
foreign country when the action began; (3) where deft. in the
character of pift. has selected the forum in which he is afterwards
sued; (4) where he has voluntarily appeared; & (5) where he has
contracted to submit himself to the forum in which the judgment
was obtained. 7
6
Duple clearly could not come within four of the foregoing five catego-
ries.7 7 The only remaining question is whether it made a "voluntary
See also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63-64 (1940), where the Court stated
that grave international problems may arise from real or imagined wrongs against
aliens which are sanctioned by the Government.
72. Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645, 650 (N.D. IlI. 1965).
73. See text accompanying notes 23 & 24 supra.
74. See von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analy-
sis, 79 HARv. L. R V. 1121, 1127 (1966).
75. See 7 HAISuRYs LAWS OF ENGLAND, Conflict of Laws §§ 265, 292 (1954);
Soci~t6 Cooperative Sidmetal v. Titan Int'l, Ltd., [1966] 1 Q.B. 828 (1965); Harris
v. Taylor, [1915] 2 K.B. 580, 591.
76. 11 ALL ENG. AND EMP. DIG. 503 (1953).
77. Duple is neither a subject of the United States nor an actual resident of any
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appearance" by appearing in the Hawaiian court to litigate the juris-
dictional issue.
English courts would apply English standards to determine the
voluntariness of Duple's appearance in the Hawaiian federal courts.78
Under English law, an appearance to challenge the jurisdiction of a
foreign court is termed a conditional appearance."9 If the defendant
loses on the jurisdictional issue, the appearance becomes uncondi-
tional (and thus voluntary), and the court is deemed to have acquired
in personam jurisdiction even when the foreign court initially lacked
jurisdiction by English standards. 80 Hence, it appears that because
Duple appeared to challenge the jurisdiction of the federal district
court, it will, under English law, be deemed to have appeared volun-
tarily in the action and to be subject to the court's jurisdiction which was
otherwise lacking.
part of the country. In addition, it has not selected the forum nor contracted to appear
in the forum. On the surface, it appears that none of the above criteria would apply
to Vauxhall. However, the English courts have extended the definition of "resident"
to include a place of business anywhere in the country of the forum. Foreign Judg-
ments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 1933 (23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 5, § 4(2)(iv) at 148.
This clearly brings Vauxhall within the English standard of proper jurisdiction because
of its numerous places of business throughout the United States. Under the above
criteria, however, Duple does not appear to qualify.
78. Under federal rules, the distinction between a general appearance and a
special appearance to challenge the jurisdiction of the court has been abolished. In-
vestors Royalty Co. v. Market Trend Survey, 206 F.2d 108, 111 (10th Cir. 1953).
In actuality, the term "voluntary appearance?' is no longer meaningful in the federal
court system. Orange Theater Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp., 139 F.2d 871,
873-74 (3d Cir. 1944). Even if there was a "voluntary appearance" in the federal
system, it would only serve to prove that the federal court had proper jurisdiction by
its own standards, which will not affect the independent English determination of
whether or not the American court initially had proper extra-territorial jurisdiction.
See note 75 supra.
79. Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 3 All E.R. 26, 29
(C.A. 1968).
80. Under normal circumstances, an appearance strictly for the purpose of chal-
lenging the jurisdiction of a court in England does not give that court jurisdiction by
virtue of the appearance. Keymer v. Reddy, [19121 1 K.B. 215. However, an
unnecessary appearance to challenge the jurisdiction of a foreign court is a submission
to the jurisdiction of that court even if the court did not have proper jurisdiction,
according to English standards, prior to the appearance, "[wlhen the defendant was
served with the process he had the alternative of doing nothing. He was not subject
to the jurisdiction of the Court, and if he had done nothing, although the Court
might have given judgment against him, the judgment could not have been enforced
against him unless he had some property within the jurisdiction of the Court. But the
defendant was not content to do nothing; he did something which he was not obliged
to do. He went to the Court and contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over
him. The Court, however, decided against this contention and held that the defendant
was amenable to its jurisdiction. In my opinion there was a voluntary appearance by
the defendant in the Isle of Man Court and a submission by him to the jurisdiction of
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Had Duple simply not appeared at all in the action, the federal
court would not have been considered to have in personam jurisdiction
according to English standards.81 In that situation, the international
implications that Judge Ely warned of might well materialize in the
form of a direct confrontation between an American court insisting on
jurisdiction over an English subject and a contrary English policy of
refusing to recognize that jurisdiction since the English defendant had
insufficient contacts with the American forum. But unless such a con-
frontation is likely to occur (and the chances are that it will not in
Duple), any suggestion that the federal court should refuse to apply
state law on the ground of adverse international implications seems un-
tenable.
Conclusion
Duple Motor Bodies v. Hollingsworths2 is a decision that, on the
surface, does not appear to be an extraordinary deviation from the
prevailing views in regard to jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.
The reasons advanced by the court in support of its decision, however,
graphically illustrate the general misconception of the Supreme
Court's holding in the landmark case of International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington.8 3 In that case, the Supreme Court indicated that jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant should be dependent on the underlying
factors of convenience and reasonableness and should not be deter-
mined by mechanical tests extracted from other decisions on different
sets of facts.
The Ninth Circuit majority in Duple never considered the con-
venience factors-which might well have dictated that the action be
brought in England where the bulk of the relevant evidence is located.
Instead, the court simply applied a mechanical "rule" extracted from
the Gray decision and held jurisdiction was proper.
that Court. If the decision of the Court on that occasion had been in his favor he
would have taken advantage of it; as the decision was against him, he was bound by it
and it became his duty to appear in the action, and if he chose not to appear and to
defend the action he must abide by the consequences which follow from his not
having done so .... The doctrine applicable to these cases is that if the defendant
has placed himself in such a position that it has become his duty to obey the judgment
of the foreign Court, then the judgment is enforceable against him in this country.
." Harris v. Taylor, [1915] 2 K.B. 580, 587-88.
81. Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 3 All E.R. 26, 29
(C.A. 1968). The English Court stated that had the defendant, who was not con-
sidered to be under foreign jurisdiction according to English standards, simply not ap-
peared at all in the action, even to challenge jurisdiction, any judgment rendered would
be unenforceable in England as being rendered by a court with incompetent jurisdic-
tion.
82. 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969).
83. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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In his dissent, Judge Ely pointed to the possibility that the court
might impinge on the function of the legislative and executive branches
of the Government by holding an alien corporation amenable to suit
in the United States on the basis of a single transaction. He implied
that the district court should not apply the Hawaiian statute to Duple,
because by doing so it could pave the way for adverse international re-
percussions. In essence, his argument is that if sanctions are to be im-
posed on subjects of a foreign nation for allowing a single injury-caus-
ing product to enter the United States, they should be imposed by
some branch of the Government other than the judiciary.
Judge Ely's argument is valid only if there is some possibility of
conflict between the action of the district court and the policy of Eng-
land. Such a conflict might arise in a case where a federal court in-
sists that it has power to impose sanctions on an English subject, and
English policy dictates that no such power exists. In Duple, however,
it appears that the possibility of conflict cannot arise. By both United
States and English standards, jurisdiction over Duple is considered
proper.
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